Introduction
Just like other countries in Eastern Europe, the Czech Republic has a particular history of development of its science and innovation system that differs from the often-analysed Western and Northern European systems. As the former centrally planned approach to doing science was condemned by many researchers as politicized science, it resulted in a strong drive on the part of the scientific community to de-politicize science after the Velvet Revolution of 1989 (Arnold, 2011; Linkova and Stöckelova, 2012) . To modernise the governance of science, a science policy councilthe Research, Development and Innovation Council (RDI Council) -was set up, together with two independent funding agencies, which award competitive funding, one for fundamental research and the other for applied research and innovation. In an effort to simplify and modernise the system and to align it with international developments, the evaluation of research and funding allocation changed as well. In order to de-politicize and depersonalise decision-making, the Czech Republic has developed a method to evaluate research and to allocate funding based on productivity. However, the Evaluation Methodology brought unintended consequences. By threatening the stability and continuity of research organisations in the Czech Republic it became subject of heated debates and even public demonstrations.
The Evaluation Methodology -in Czech Metodika hodnocení, colloquially referred to as the 'coffee mill' -counts research outputs and assigns a certain number of points to each, grinding different research outputs through the same mill. The points are then translated into institutional research funding, with each point representing a certain number of Czech crowns (CZK). Hence, the Evaluation Methodology combines two functions: it is both a mechanism for evaluating research and for allocating institutional funding for R&D, with a direct, automatic link between the two. As such, the Evaluation Methodology is a performance-based research funding system (PFRS). Other PFRS, or elements thereof, have been implemented in the UK, Spain, Slovakia, Hong Kong, Australia, Poland, Italy, New Zealand, Flanders, Norway, Denmark, Finland and elsewhere (Butler, 2010; Hicks, 2012) .
In this paper we analyse the development, performance and effects of the Czech Evaluation Methodology in the period [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] . Based on current debates on research evaluation and performance-based research funding systems (Geuna and Martin 2003; Rodrigues-Navaro 2009; Butler 2003 Butler , 2010 Hicks 2012; Gläser and Laudel, 2007; Martin and Whitley, 2010; Martin 2011; Molas-Gallart 2012) , we will show how the Czech Evaluation Methodology stands out. As it only focuses on research outputs and is purely metrics based it is uniquely radical among the performance-based research funding systems in operation worldwide. We will argue that a purely quantitative assessment can introduce significant threats and cause discontinuities in a research system. This is particularly problematic in a research and innovation system in development, such as in transition countries, as it fails to provide policymakers and research organisations with the information needed to develop and progress.
After the methodology section, we describe the introduction and the evolution of the Evaluation Methodology against the background of Czech research and research policy. We go on to explain the workings of the 2010 version of the Evaluation Methodology, which links the evaluation of research with the allocation of funding. We then show how the Czech research community reacted to it and assess its impacts. Finally, we evaluate the Evaluation Methodology against the literature on performance-based research funding systems and research evaluation more generally.
Methodology
The paper and its conclusions are based on research conducted in 2010 and 2011 in the context of the "International Audit of R&D&I in the Czech Republic" commissioned by the Czech Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (Arnold, 2011) . One task of the International Audit was the analysis and evaluation of the Evaluation Methodology. Consequently, we analysed the Evaluation Methodology based on an extensive analysis of Czech research policy documents (including the different versions of the Evaluation Methodology from [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] ) and a literature review of international scientific literature about institutional research funding and performance-based research funding systems. In addition, we surveyed 689 researchers and 74 research managers (rectors, deans, research institute directors) on the use and usefulness of the Evaluation Methodology. The surveys were online, conducted in mid 2010 and were open for six weeks. Questionnaires were piloted using a small sample of respondents. We contacted 2.636 individual researchers (response rate 26%) and 343 research managers (response rate 22%). Tables 1 and 2 below describe some of the features of the respondents. Respondents came from the universities, the Academy of Sciences and other research institutes. As can be seen in the tables below, a large share both of research managers and researchers started employment in the organisation 20 years ago and more, showing the continuity in staffing in Czech research organisations. The institutionalisation of research in the Czech Republic goes back a long way. Founded in 1348, Charles University is the first university established in Central Europe, and the tradition of nonuniversity research institutes goes back to the Royal Czech Society of Sciences (1784 Sciences ( -1952 and the Czech Academy of Science and Arts (1890-1952) . However, within the centrally planned system a specific research constellation was set up, characterised by a close entanglement of science and Communist party politics. The former Czechoslovakia knew a separation of research and teaching, with research being conducted predominately within the Academy of Sciences, established in 1953. The right to award PhD degrees belonged exclusively to the Academy of Sciences. Teaching was performed by the university system ). Research and industry were structurally linked, with big industrial research centres being part of key branches of Czechoslovak industries.
After the fall of the Iron Curtain and the separation of the former Czechoslovakia, a strong need to reform the Czech research system emerged, and over the years the organisational landscape has changed radically, as has the governance of science (Arnold, 2011) . Universities are now tasked with doing research, and the right to confer PhD degrees has been transferred from the Academy of Sciences to the universities. As for the industrial research, many of the research centres were closed so that links between science and industry were weakened.
With regard to the governance system, two new R&D funding organisations -one for fundamental research and the other for applied research -were introduced. More importantly, a RDI Council was set up as an expert advisory body to the government. In the 2008 Reform of the National RDI System, this RDI Council became the central body responsible for the coordination of the national RDI governance. The RDI Council has 16 members representing research and industry; in addition, there is the Chair, who is normally the Prime Minister. The RDI Council makes use of the support of three disciplinary advisory expert committees and two advisory commissions, one being the Commission for Evaluation. It is within this context of restructuring the research system and under the direction of the RDI Council that the Evaluation Methodology was introduced, gradually operationalised and implemented.
The development of funding in the Czech Republic
With regard to the Czech R&D funding system, we can identify three distinct periods during the transition period (Arnold, 2011) . The first period, from 1990-98, involved the transformation of research performers and research governance organisations. Governmental budget allocations were still based on the level of expenditures in previous years. However, the Academy of Sciences instituted an internal funding reform based on peer review to assess the quality of research from 1993 onwards.
The second period from 1998-2003 prepared the Czech Republic for joining the European Union. In 1998, the 'Research Intentions' system was introduced in order to increase strategic planning and accountability. Research intentions were forward-looking plans, explaining how research organisations intended to use institutional research funding to reach specific institutional objectives. However, they did not have the intended positive consequences, and they quickly fell into disrepute due to failure to implement them effectively: "It was extremely bureaucratic, the outcomes were random, the peer review failed" (interview, researcher and policy advisor, 2o10). The first National R&D Policy of the Czech Republic in 2000 stressed the importance of R&D evaluation and the creation of an 'evaluation culture', and led to the introduction of the Evaluation Methodology in 2004.
In the third period, from 2004 onwards, the Evaluation Methodology was to be a safeguard against nepotism and corruption, a tool that was de-politicised and objective: "There was a group of people that was inspired by messages from other countries, and by bibliometrics, and they wanted a system that would work automatically and simply, and completely computerised" (Czech researcher and advisor to the government). In addition, the Evaluation Methodology was expected to combat the lack of productivity of a large number of research organisations: "A huge In short, the funding for universities essentially comes from two separate budgets: the budget for R&D and the budget for higher education/teaching. 3 In 2010 and 2011, institutional funding for R&D made up around 20% of total university budget. In contrast, institutional research funding at the Academy of Sciences was 52% of total budget in 2010, as the Academy of Sciences does not receive funds for teaching as it is not tasked to teach.
The transformation of the Evaluation Methodology
The 2004 Evaluation Methodology was very ambitious. It aimed to improve evaluation at all levels by setting standards for evaluating research projects, programmes, organisations, and policies. Designed mainly by natural scientists in the RDI Council, it also introduced the concept of 'quantitative results evaluation', while stressing the importance of respecting the differences between fields. R&D outputs were considered important evidence for determining institutional funding. However, at this stage, this did not imply an automatic link between research evaluation (by counting R&D outputs) and the allocation of funding.
The shift to a performance-based research funding system occurred in the context of the 2008 Reform of the National RDI System. This reform was not only about the shift to a performance-based research funding system but also sought to simplify and modernise the system and improve its governance. More specifically, it aimed to support research excellence and the application of research, improve research-industry cooperation, make public research organisations more flexible, improve the supply of human resources and increase international collaboration in research .
In terms of research funding, the poor perceived 4 performance drove a decision to shift to a fully performance-based research funding system replacing the research intentions (RDI Council, 2008) . The reform specified that the amount of funding going to the ministries in charge of R&D and to the Academy of Sciences should be determined by the aggregated R&D outputs of the research organisations, as defined by the Evaluation Methodology. Hence, 2009 marks the introduction of the metrics-based evaluation of R&D outputs as a performance-based research funding system, albeit only at the level of funding bodies 5 . The 2010 Methodology formally introduced the allocation of funding at the level of organisations, enforcing and expanding the use of metrics-based evaluation of R&D. Arnold et.al., 2011, especially page 38-42. 4 Official statistical analyses of the performance of the Czech research and innovation system during the last decade show that Czech performance and that of other Eastern European new EU member states lag behind that of Western European countries. Nonetheless, and while there was scope for a great deal of catching up, Czech academic research output was growing substantively, while citation and productivity performance were improving faster than in most other new member states (Arnold, 2011) . 5 I.e. ministries and the Academy of Sciences. In practice, the Evaluation Methodology was also used by research-performing organisations to distribute institutional funding internally. An exception was the Academy of Sciences which uses its own internal evaluation system to allocate research funding to its various institutes.
The workings of the Evaluation Methodology
The main features of the Czech Evaluation Methodology (as of 2009) include the translation of research outputs from all types of research organisations and all types of disciplines into points, and the subsequent translation of points into money.
The Evaluation Methodology counts R&D outputs, that is bibliometric outputs (articles, books, conference proceedings) and 'applied outputs' (patents, utility models etc.). In more practical terms, the already existing, centralised R&D information system (RIV), in which research organisations are required to input their research outputs, functions as the source of information. Based on this database, a certain number of points is assigned to each output. Both eligible outputs and numbers of points assigned per output have been modified repeatedly over time, meaning that there has been a new version of the Evaluation Methodology every year.
The number of points a research organisation gets determines the amount of institutional R&D funding it receives. Research outputs from the previous five years are used to calculate the total number of points. Each point represents a certain amount of money, although this amount depends on the total budget and fluctuates every year. Hence, the allocation of institutional R&D money is mechanistic, avoiding political decisions about how much money each research organisation and each type of research organisation obtains. This ties back to one of the reasons why the Evaluation Methodology was introduced, namely mistrust following bad experiences of corruption and nepotism.
Unusually in an international context, the Evaluation Methodology is used for all types of research organisations, irrespective of their mission and role. The list of organisations eligible for institutional funding through the Evaluation Methodology includes mostly universities, institutes of the Academy of Sciences, and applied research institutes. However, it also includes organisations that have other missions than doing research, e.g. museums and hospitals.
Moreover, the Evaluation Methodology is used for all disciplines, irrespective of their publishing patterns and their propensity to publish. 6 This has been recognised as a problem, and successive versions of the Evaluation Methodology have tried to account of these differences through incremental changes over the years. In an attempt to differentiate among different research fields, the RDI Council decided to sort research outputs into two large groups, distinguishing between the social sciences and humanities and other fields of research. Moreover, in 2010 'damping factors' for groups of disciplines were introduced, aiming to limit the size of shifts in funding among scientific fields and categories of outputs from year to year. These were incremental changes in the sense that they did not change the fundamental character of the Evaluation Methodology. In the words of an influential researcher: "What has changed is only some refinements of the Evaluation Methodology related to different research fields and the number of points given to a certain result were also changed from time to time, but in an arbitrary way" (interview 2010).
.The translation of research outputs into points
By way of illustration, in the Evaluation Methodology 2010, a table is used to translate research outputs into points (see Table 3 ). Research outputs that receive points range from journal articles (categories J and D), to books (category B) to applied research outputs (categories P-V), and the number of points assigned by the RDI Council to each output ranges from 4 to 500 points.
More specifically, and in light of the distinction made between the social sciences and humanities and all other fields of research, disciplines registered in the Czech National Excellence Reference Framework NERR for the social sciences and humanities receive more points than disciplines not registered there in order to alleviate the inequalities between disciplines. The NERR includes philosophy and religion, history, archaeology, anthropology, ethnology, political science, administration, legal science, linguistics, literature, mass media, and audiovisuals, art, architecture, cultural heritage, educational science. In these fields, articles published in peer-reviewed Czech scientific periodicals (category Jrec) obtain more points than in all other disciplines ('other specialisations'). The same approach applies to ERIH (European Reference Index for the Humanities) publications (category Jneimp) and monographs (category B). 3. Evaluation of Jimp = 10 + 295 × factor, where: Factor = (1 -N) / (1 + (N / 0,057)), where N is the normalised rank of the journal, N = (P -1) / (Pmax -1) P = rank of the journal in the given specialization according to Journal Citation Report in a sequence sorted descending by Impact Factor (IF). The IF value used is the IF value valid in the year of result realization, not IF-5. Pmax = total number of journals in the given specialization according to Journal Citation Report If a journal is listed under multiple specializations, the normative rank N will be calculated as the arithmetic mean of the normative ranks of the journal for all the specializations where it occurs.
4. If the IF is introduced in the SCOPUS database, the results for the following period will be attributed point scores similarly to Jimp.
5. These are the multidisciplinary journals (journals of open specialization) Nature (ISSN 0028-0836), and Science (ISSN 0036-8075).
6. The world-renowned databases are ERIH category A, ERIH category B, ERIH category C, or SCOPUS.
7. The list of reviewed non-impacted journals published in the Czech Republic including information on origin and validity is available at www.vyzkum.cz. In 2010, when we started our research, the Evaluation Methodology had become a subject of heated debate and highly visible public demonstrations: "If the CR doesn't stop this nonsense, we can close down the whole of research within three years (interview university administrator, 2010)" Against this background we conducted a survey to understand how the Czech research community viewed the Evaluation Methodology, surveying researchers as well as research organization leaders (rectors, deans, directors).
EPO -European
In general, researchers regarded the Evaluation Methodology in a rather unfavourable light. In particular, they felt that the Evaluation Methodology does 'not at all' or only 'to a limited extent' consider all aspects relevant to judge the quality of research, do justice to the differences between research institutes, and between disciplines, and encourage collaboration. Or as one rector put it: "One of the key weaknesses of the Evaluation Methodology is that it does not do justice to different modes of research, for instance basic research, development or innovation" (interview 2010). While 58% of respondents agreed to 'a large or very large extent' that the Czech system for institutional funding was in need of reform, only 20% agreed to 'a large or very large extent' that the Evaluation Methodology was the right way to effect this change.
Researchers from the Czech Academy of Science are significantly less satisfied with the Evaluation Methodology than researchers from universities and other research organisations (63% not at all satisfied compared to 24% at universities and 29% at other research organisations). Respondents from the Academy of Science viewing the Evaluation Methodology less favourably than their counterparts may be due to the perception that Academy institutes fare worst with the Evaluation Methodology: 21% of respondents from universities agreed to a 'large or very large extent' that they would receive more institutional funding as a result of the Evaluation Methodology, while only 13% from research organisations and 7% from Academy institutes said so.
As expected, there were differences in perception among the different disciplines. More than 60% of respondents from the social sciences and humanities felt that the Evaluation Methodology did not at all do justice to the differences between the disciplines, compared to 37% from the natural sciences and life sciences and 39% from the engineering/technical sciences. This is due to the different research outputs having different values in the table, with some having considerably less value then others, for instance a book (40 points) compared to a Czech patent (200 points). Obviously, this is to the disadvantage of the social sciences and humanities. As a consequence, many researchers from the social sciences and humanities felt that they were losing out as a result of the Evaluation Methodology. While 15% of respondents from the natural sciences, 14% from engineering/technical sciences and 11% from life sciences agreed 'to a large extent' that the Evaluation Methodology would result in their organisation receiving more institutional funding, only 2% from the social sciences and humanities did so. This effect is also seen in other performance-based research funding systems, for instance the UK Research Assessment Exercise (Martin and Whitley, 2010) .
Effects of the Evaluation Methodology on performance
When looking at the effects of the introduction of PRFS on performance, it should be noted that the Czech Republic has long had a policy of increasing research expenditure in the universities, so the PRFS is not the only cause of the growth in outputs. Analyses of the Evaluation Methodology and its effects (Vanecek, 2013; Fiala, 2013) show no clear relationship between the introduction of PRFS and increasing performance. More specifically, Vanecek (2013) points out that universities' output growth began in 2005-6, just after the introduction of the Evaluation Methodology, but that there was no further acceleration following the introduction of the PRFS. While the growth in output was greater than in a panel of seven other European countries 7 , growth in the citation impact of Czech publications lagged the others. Applications to the Czech patent office grew rapidly from 2003 -and came mostly from public research organisations rather than companies. Czech applications to the European and US patent offices grew faster than in the comparator countries, too -though from a very low base, overtaking only those from Hungary. In addition, Fiala (2013) shows that from 2008 to 2011, Czech universities more than doubled their overall research output. Thus, there was an increase of 140% in scientific productivity in this period. This can be documented by the year-by-year growth in 2009, 2010, and 2011, which is 65%, 30%, and 12%, respectively. Therefore, research productivity is still growing but the growth is slowing down. This slow-down does not underpin the hypothesis that growth in research outputs is due to the Evaluation Methodology as one would expect the growth to be accelerating rather than slowing down.
Unintended effects of the Evaluation Methodology
Not surprisingly, the Evaluation Methodology did have unintended consequences. A large majority of the survey respondents pointed out that the Evaluation Methodology made researchers and research organisations behave more opportunistically (63% agree to 'a large extent' or 'a very large extent', 21% 'to a moderate extent'). This is in line with academic reflections on performance-based funding systems, showing that they can have large effects on collective behaviour (Butler, 2003 (Butler, , 2010 Martin and Whitley, 2010) . For instance, in the UK evidence suggests that researchers are better placed in the Research Assessment Exercise if they focus on short-term, incremental, mono-disciplinary or applied research. In addition, a transfer market has emerged in "star" researchers that occurs before each Research Assessment Exercise round. And when Australia introduced a simple and mechanical system based on publication numbers in 1995, this resulted in an increased number of publications (Australia's contribution to the Science Citation Index increased by 25% through the 1990s), but researchers systematically shifted their output towards lower impact factor journals in order to achieve greater publication numbers, leading to a decline in Australia's relative citation impact in the same period. As in the Australian case many researchers we interviewed stressed that in the Czech Evaluation Methodology, a large number of mediocre results can weigh much more then (single) outstanding contributions.
Strategies to boost the number of points include adapting outputs to make them countable and make them count more. Some interviewees told us that such 'fake' outputs make up a substantial part of the outputs submitted. More concretely, activities of a research institute that normally would not lead to countable research outputs are adapted in order to make them count. An example would be textbooks that are published as scientific monographs. Other strategies are re-publishing older works and establishing working paper series and promoting them as if they were refereed journals. Moreover, local citations are used to boost the impact factor of a journal that actually publishes poor-quality articles. These journals are typically located in Eastern European countries, including the Czech Republic, and are often in the social sciences and humanities. As can be seen in Table 4 , while all types of publications increased in numbers between 2009 and 2010, those publications that are most easily manipulated -Czech reviewed journals, books and book chapters, as well as proceedingsgrew at the highest rate.
Finally, the way the Evaluation Methodology treats applied research outputs makes them subject to opportunistic behaviour too. Various applied outputs are said to be quite easy to produce, e.g. utility models or the national 'small patent' only require an administrative act to file. In addition, a prototype receives 40 points, regardless of whether it has been created by one person in one year or by a whole team over several years. As there is no quality check on applied research outputs and originality and functionality are not required, existing and non-functioning solutions are registered. "Some results earn cheap points. For instance, the output category utility models are a cheap way to earn points. One can easily create twenty such designs within a month for 40 points each, which means 800 points, multiplied by 4000 Czech crowns per point. That is very attractive for an institute!" (interview director of research institute, 2010). Table 4 shows that most applied research outputs (categories P to Z) have grown at an amazing rate since their introduction. Table 4 illustrates some effects of opportunistic behaviour, as research actors, quite understandably, want to attain the highest possible research income. There is an increase in research outputs (or more precisely, the number of points assigned to them) after the introduction of the Evaluation Methodology. However, the question is whether it has increased the productivity and the quality of research. Furthermore, the unpredictability of the Evaluation Methodology increases the 'hunt for points' even more. As research organisations do not know how much money they will earn for their points in the following year, they do not know how much institutional funding they will receive Consequently, they accumulate as many points a possible, inflating the total number of points in relation to the total amount of relative institutional R&D funding, with the result that a point is worth less and less: "Within the system, everyone is now obsessed with getting points. The total number of points has grown from one year to the next. In 2009, 1 point = 10k crowns. In 2011 a point will be worth only 4k crowns. So it's impossible to do serious financial planning against this background" (Interview civil servant, 2010).
Unpredictability and instability
While in 2010 less than 50% of institutional research funding was allocated based on the Evaluation Methodology, this share was supposed to grow to 100% over the coming years. However, already in 2010, the Evaluation Methodology was causing large and erratic changes in institutional funding, making institutional funding unreliable and planning a challenge: "It is important to have institutional money in order to fund development -the coffee grinder would lock you in… Without stability, you quickly lose the best people" (interview vice-rector, 2010). In our interviews, research managers explained that due to the unpredictability of institutional funding, institutes started to focus on short-term strategies to solve immediate problems. Due to the large uncertainty about future developments regarding the implementation and translation of the Evaluation Methodology into funding, more thought-out coping strategies are next to impossible. However, in a research environment -where time horizons are inherently long -long-term planning is important to create high-quality research results.
It is outside the scope of this paper to go into depth about how different types of research organisations are coping specifically with the instability, unpredictability and discontinuity of funding, but we analysed how it plays out differently for various scientific fields and disciplines. 8 As can be seen in Table 5 , between 2008 and 2010 some disciplines experienced increases in their share of institutional funding of over 200%, while others experienced decreases of similar magnitude. Scientific fields with percentages highlighted in bold ( Source: Elaboration of data in the report of the "Project for the preparation of the Methodology to evaluate the results of research organisations and of programmes finished in 2010", Secretariat of the Board of the RDI Council, 2010; Technology Centre (Czech Academy of Sciences).
As a result of these large fluctuations, the 2010 Evaluation Methodology introduced 'damping factors' for groups of disciplines, aiming to limit shifts in funding among scientific fields and categories of outputs. First of all, dampening factors were initially set, so that fluctuations in funding between science fields could not exceed 15%. Second, changes in funding between basic and applied research were not allowed to exceed 1.5%. Third, changes in funding for various categories of research outputs could not change by more than 150%, with the exception of Jimp (article in journals covered by WoS) and Jneimp (articles in journals covered by SCOPUS or ERIH and article in (Czech) peer-reviewed journals).
However, these damping factors were not sufficient to solve the unequal treatment of disciplines. Most importantly, the research outputs that weigh the most -that is articles published in journals covered by the WoS (Jimp journals) -were excluded from the damping factor (Table 6 ). These articles accounted for 65% of the points achieved in 2009. Hence, the damping factor actually only covered 35% of research outputs. In addition, while differences in scientific fields were taken into account, there were still considerable inter-field differences that were not addressed, such as different publishing patterns among disciplines (e.g. economics and history). Both aspects limit the effectiveness of the damping factors. 
The Evaluation Methodology in international context
There are some common themes running through the rationales used to justify the introduction of performance-based research funding systems. Governments use PRFS to (i) stimulate efficiency in research activity; (ii) allocate resources based on merit; (iii) reduce information asymmetry between supply and demand for new knowledge; (iv) inform research policies and institutional strategies; and (v) demonstrate that investment in research is effective and delivers public benefits (Abramo, D'Angelo and Di Costa, 2011) . In the tradition of New Public Management (Ferlie et al, 1996; Boston et al, 1996) , PRFS seek to increase accountability for the expenditure of taxpayers' money. They are seen as a means for selectively distributing research funds, but most also seek to use them to drive particular behaviours. While the Czech Republic is using a PFRS to guarantee objectivity and transparency, improve productivity and quality of research and emphasize innovation, the shift to performance based funding is generally also part of a broader movement to make universities more autonomous and introduce more strategic university research management.
With more and more countries emphasising accountability in their research systems, there is a growing academic body of literature on research evaluation and performance-based research funding systems (Geuna and Martin, 2003; Rodrigues-Navaro, 2009; Butler, 2003 Butler, , 2010 Hicks, 2012; Gläser and Laudel, 2007; Martin and Whitley, 2010; Auranen and Nieminen, 2010; Martin, 2011; MolasGallart, 2012) . This discusses a variety of important dimensions of performance-based research funding systems, on which the Czech Evaluation Methodology systematically stands out as distinct: unit of analysis, periodicity, output measures, cost, weight of output indictors, percentage of funding allocated by performance-based research funding system, and disciplinary differences.
Performance-based research funding systems have different units of analysis, for example, the Spanish system measures and rewards individual performance (Hicks, 2012; Molas-Gallart, 2012) . The UK and Hong Kong RAEs have 'units of assessment' that correspond more or less to departments or research groups. However, most performance-based research funding systems operate at the level of organisations. They are generally applied to a relatively homogeneous group of organisations, most often to public universities. In contrast, the Czech Evaluation Methodology is applied to a very heterogeneous group of organisations, ranging from universities, institutes of the Czech Academy of Sciences, applied research institutes to museums and university hospitals.
In terms of periodicity of funding allocation, the Czech Evaluation Methodology is in a minority too, as the funding is allocated annually, which leads to uncertainty in the planning of research organisations. In other countries, intervals between funding allocation exercises are longer, thus giving research organisations planning security. In Finland, for example, while the funding formula is calculated annually like in the Czech Republic, budgets are given for a three-year period, and a fouryear period as of 2013 (Hölttä and Rekilä, 2003; Mäkeläinen, 2010) . In the UK RAE, intervals have varied since the RAE was introduced in 1986. After an initial interval of three years (1986, 1989, 1992) , it was expanded to four and five years (1996 and 2001) . After 2001, there was a growing sense that the RAE had become too cumbersome and costly, and after a thorough review, the RAE took place again in 2008, with the new periodicity being six years (2014, 2020) (Roberts, 2003; Bence and Oppenheimer, 2005; Martin and Whitely, 2010) . In short, both cases show a tendency towards longer budget periods, while the Czech Evaluation Methodology allocates one-year budgets.
Research evaluation processes tend to focus on four output measures: volume; quality; impact; and utility (Geuna and Martin, 2003) . The earlier systems tend to be heavily based upon peer review, paying attention to all four output measures. However, as in the Czech Republic, there is growing interest in indicator-based systems, reflecting a desire to simplify and reduce the cost of assessment. Even among indicators-based systems, cost is a major consideration. While Norway chose to establish a national system of grading journals and to require researchers to input their publications into a central database, Sweden has opted to focus on ISI journals and ISI-derived indicators in order to put a system in place more quickly and economically than was the case in Norway (Carlsson, 2009 ). 9 However, metrics-based systems put a predominant weight on volume indicators, while quality and impact is more difficult to capture with quantitative indicators, compared to peer review. This is why the first UK Research Excellence Framework proposal put forward in 2006, which was largely metrics-based, was abandoned after extensive consultation taking into account the scientific community's reservations. In contrast, in the Czech Republic peer review is largely viewed with scepticism for fear of corruption and nepotism, and the use of indicators in the Czech Republic is driven by a desire to de-politicise and de-personalise the evaluation and funding process.
Most indicator-based performance-based research funding systems use a variety of indicators -not only output indicators (scientific publications and research outputs) but also input indicators (e.g. recruitment of PhD students and academic staff), process indicators (e.g. seminar and conference activity, international visiting research appointments), and structure indicators (e.g. number of PhD students, research collaborations and partnerships) (Foss Hansen, 2010) . Typically, the weight of output indicators in a funding formula is small. In Norway, research publications are only one of four indicators that drive institutional research funding, the others being: PhD production; EU research funding; research funding from the Research Council of Norway (Sivertsen, 2010) . In Finland, scientific publications drive only 5% of formula-based institutional funding for research and researcher education. Other indicators used include number of researchers, number of doctoral degrees completed at the university, external research funding, and researcher mobility (Hölttä and Rekilä, 2003; Mäkeläinen, 2010) . In contrast, the Czech Evaluation Methodology only uses output indicators, with the consequence that output indicators have a weight of 100%.
Furthermore, the percentage of funding that depends on the research evaluation is a key feature of performance-based research funding systems. Performance-based research funding systems typically move small amounts of money around each time they are performed (Sivertsen, 2010) . In terms of shares of public university funding, for example, in 2008 the performance-based research funding systems in Australia and New Zealand governed 10% of university funding, in Italy and Norway 2%, and in Sweden 12.5% (Hicks, 2012) . Also, there typically are 'correcting factors' to maintain stability in the system. For example, the UK Higher Education Funding Council operates a 'moderation fund' to help universities cope with changes. In the Czech Republic, however, the Evaluation Methodology governs 100% of institutional research funding.
Finally, accounting for disciplinary differences has not only been a major concern in the Czech Evaluation Methodology but also in other performance-based research funding systems. There are various ways of accounting for major differences in propensity to publish in fields. For example, the UK RAE achieves this by not putting different fields in competition with each other. Instead, similar departments compete within about 60 'units of assessment' so that the RAE rewards quality within disciplines but does not cause competition among disciplines. In contrast, the Czech system sets the disciplines against each other and tries to compensate for differences in publication behaviour in the Evaluation Methodology. The Evaluation Methodology has tried to take into account differences between disciplines by including different types of research outputs (e.g. not only journal articles but also books), by sorting research outputs into two large disciplinary groups ('specialisations') and in 2010 by introducing 'damping factors' among ten disciplinary groups.
Comparing the Czech Evaluation Methodology with other performance-based research funding systems along various dimensions clearly shows that the Czech system is uniquely radical in its focus on scientific publications and other research outputs and their automatic translation into money. What is more, the Czech performance-based research funding system is applied annually to all types of research organisations, allocating 100% of institutional research funding.
Conclusions
In 2010, when we started our research, the Evaluation Methodology had become a subject of heated debate and even demonstrations in the streets. It turned out that the protest was not directed against accountability but against the methods used to assess research: from a rather comprehensive research assessment approach sketched out in the initial policy papers, the Evaluation Methodology turned into a purely quantitative and mechanistic tool for counting and rating publications and other research outputs ('coffee mill') to calculate institutional funding. This transformation occurred through continuous modifications, discussed and decided on by the RDI council. As such, the Evaluation Methodology became a new way to safeguard accountability in the publicly funded research system especially institutional funding decisions, based on assessments of research outputs. In addition, the original intention to use the Evaluation Methodology as a way to depersonalise and depoliticise the research system appeared to be attained through a metrification of quality. However, the Evaluation Methodology did not rule out political decisions, but simply concealed them behind numbers: "Now the political decisions are hidden in the points system!" (interview rector, 2010).
While the Czech research community agrees on the need for more objective funding decisions and a need to improve research output, and sees the development of accountability through research assessment as an important step to achieve this, the Evaluation Methodology has not fulfilled these requirements: "If the assessment system is wrong, the allocation of money based on this system simply cannot be right" (interview rector, 2010). As such, the Evaluation Methodology can be seen as a symptom of the lack of trust in the Czech system and its operation confirms the observation that not only measurement but also trust is needed for effective governance of the research system. Instead of improving the quality of research, the Evaluation Methodology has threatened the stability and the continuity of research organisations in the Czech Republic and has become a serious problem of the Czech research and innovation system. Responsible policy makers in the Czech Republic are aware of the problems related to the Evaluation Methodology, and they are in the process of transforming the way in which funding decisions are made. After the International Audit presented its results -with similar conclusions as presented here -a number of emergency measures were taken (for example decreasing the share of funding allocated through the Evaluation Methodology) to mitigate the threats to the stability and continuity of the research system.
Internationally, the use of performance-based research funding systems has mixed consequences but does appear to bring benefits in terms of increasing accountability and transparency, linking performance with research funding. However, a great deal of care has to go into the design of the system, combining quantitative and qualitative methods, in order to avoid unintended -and sometimes perverse -consequences. These exercises are typically intended not only to reward or punish performance but to also influence behaviour, in particular to increase research quality. In the best case, PRFS can encourage research organisations to improve their research management and planning. In the Czech case, in contrast, the Evaluation Methodology causes discontinuity and instability in the system, making strategic planning next to impossible. This is a particular problem in a research and innovation system in transition, such as in the Czech Republic; giving only quantitative information on research outputs, it fails to support policymakers and research organisations with information needed to improve the quality of research and to develop their organisation.
Our analysis of the Evaluation Methodology emphasises the problematic sides a performance-based research funding system can have. It serves as a negative example of a performance-based research funding system that is purely metrics-based and focused on research outputs only. In its unique radicalism, it is of interest for the academic community studying performance-based research funding systems and their impacts, as well as to policy makers considering the introduction of such a system. As such it contributes to debates in the literature about the advantages and disadvantages of such systems.
Finally, our analysis of the contemporary dynamics of the research system in the Czech Republic directs attention of scholars of research policy to significant and noteworthy developments in Central and Eastern Europe. With some notable exceptions (Radosevic and Lepori, 2009; Linkova and Stöckelova, 2012; Fiala 2013; Vanecek 2013) , the research evaluation and science policy communities have until now paid scant attention to this region. This is a missed opportunity, both for the research policy community and Central and Eastern European countries. As this article shows, research can benefit from analyses of these research systems, especially when studying interactions between politico-economic regimes and research policy, their developments and dynamics. In turn, the countries under study would benefit from academic analysis, both from scholars within and outside the country, learning about the functioning of research systems.
